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Mirrors	Without	Warnings		
Roman	Frigg1	and	James	Nguyen2	Forthcoming	in	Synthese			 Abstract		Veritism,	the	position	that	truth	is	necessary	for	epistemic	acceptability,	seems	to	be	in	tension	with	 the	 observation	 that	 much	 of	 our	 best	 science	 is	 not,	 strictly	 speaking,	 true	 when	interpreted	literally.	This	generates	a	paradox:	(i)	truth	is	necessary	for	epistemic	acceptability;	(ii)	 the	 claims	 of	 science	 have	 to	 be	 taken	 literally;	 (iii)	much	 of	what	 science	 produces	 is	 not	literally	true	and	yet	it	is	acceptable.	We	frame	Elgin’s	project	in	True	Enough	as	being	motivated	by,	and	offering	a	particular	resolution	to,	this	paradox.	We	discuss	the	paradox	with	a	particular	focus	 on	 scientific	 models	 and	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 another	 resolution	 available	 which	 is	compatible	 with	 retaining	 veritism:	 rejecting	 the	 idea	 that	 scientific	 models	 should	 be	interpreted	literally.					
1.	Introduction			Veritism	 is	 the	 position	 that	 truth	 is	 necessary	 for	 epistemic	 acceptability.	Catherine	Elgin’s	True	Enough	provides	an	extended	argument	against	veritism	and	in	favour	of	radically	rethinking	epistemology.	She	notes	that	veritism	does	not	 sit	 well	 with	 scientific	 practice	 because	 “science	 unabashedly	 relies	 on	models,	 idealizations,	 and	 thought	 experiments	 that	 are	known	not	 to	be	 true”	(p.	 1).3	A	 clock	 is	modelled	 as	 an	 ideal	 pendulum;	 a	 planet	 as	 a	 point	mass;	 a	population	 as	 infinite;	 and	 so	 on.	 A	 veritistic	 epistemology	 must	 regard	 such	models	as	mere	heuristics	that	have	no	place	in	the	final	edifice	of	science.	Elgin	rejects	the	dismissal	of	 falsehoods	as	ultimately	dispensable	expedients.	Rather	than	 being	 a	 flaw,	 the	 divergence	 from	 the	 truth	 of	 many	 models	 and	idealizations	“fosters	their	epistemic	functioning”	(ibid.).	This	requires	a	revision	of	 the	central	planks	of	 traditional	epistemology	–	belief,	knowledge,	assertion,	and	truth	–	which	she	aims	to	replace	with	notions	that	are	not	truth-directed:	acceptance,	profession,	understanding,	and	what	she	calls	felicitous	falsehoods.			In	 this	paper	we	examine	 the	 starting	point	of	Elgin’s	project	 and	ask	whether	making	sense	of	the	observation	that	science	involves	the	use	of	models	which,	if	interpreted	 literally,	 are	 false	 about	 their	 target	 systems	 really	 requires	 far-reaching	 revisions	 in	 epistemology,	 or	 whether	 this	 insight	 can	 be	accommodated	in	another	way.	We	show	that	the	rejection	of	veritism	rests	on	a	literalist	understanding	of	models,	and	we	argue	that	such	an	understanding	can																																																									1	r.p.frigg@lse.ac.uk	Department	of	Philosophy,	Logic	and	Scientific	Method,	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	(LSE),	London,	UK	and	Centre	for	Philosophy	of	Natural	and	Social	Science	(CPNSS),	LSE,	London,	UK.	2	james.nguyen@sas.ac.uk,	Department	of	Philosophy,	University	College	London,	London,	UK,	Institute	of	Philosophy,	School	of	Advanced	Study,	University	of	London,	London,	UK,	and	CPNSS,	LSE,	London,	UK.		3	All	references	are	to	Elgin’s	(2017)	unless	indicated	otherwise.		
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be	resisted.	 In	 fact,	one	can	retain	veritism	and	give	up	 literalism,	and	one	can	utilise	Elgin’s	own	account	of	scientific	representation	to	this	end.	In	doing	so	we	highlight	 a	 so	 far	 underappreciated	 connection	 between	 the	 literature	 on	veritism	 in	 the	 debates	 over	 scientific	 understanding	 and	 explanation	 –	 there	usually	referred	to	as	the	question	of	whether	explanation	and/or	understanding	is/are	‘factive’	(see,	for	example	Doyle	et	al.’s	(2018)	and	the	references	therein)	–	and	the	literature	on	scientific	representation	(see	our	(2016b,	2017a)	and	the	references	 therein).	 We	 hope	 that	 by	 making	 this	 explicit	 we	 will	 encourage	more	work	exploring	the	connections	between	various	different	positions	across	those	debates.					We	proceed	as	follows.	In	Section	2	we	review	the	role	that	veritism	plays	in	the	philosophy	 of	 science,	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 how	 the	 notions	 of	 truth,	
knowledge,	 and	 belief	 are	 used	 to	 characterize	 the	 conceptual	 landscape.	 In	Section	3	we	offer	a	novel	way	 to	 frame	Elgin’s	project.	Rather	 than	 taking	 the	prevalence	 of	 idealisations	 in	 science	 –	 construed	 as	 falsehoods	 when	interpreted	 literally	 –	 as	 a	 premise	 for	 an	 anti-veritist	 conclusion,	 we	demonstrate	that	there	is	a	more	general	paradox	underlying	her	discussion.	The	paradox	 is	 in	 the	 form	 of	 three	 propositions,	 each	 of	 which	 seem	 prima	 facie	plausible,	but	which	are	mutually	inconsistent:	(i)	vertism,	(ii)	literalism,	and	(iii)	the	 fact	 that	 many	 parts	 of	 science	 are	 epistemically	 acceptable	 and	 yet	inaccurate	when	interpreted	literally.	Construed	in	this	way,	anyone	who	grants	(iii)	is	required	to	give	up	on	at	least	one	of	(i)	and	(ii),	and	thus	take	a	stand	on	questions	 concerning	 explanation/understanding	 and/or	 scientific	representation.	We	frame	Elgin’s	project	as	offering	one	solution	to	the	paradox:	rejecting	 veritism.	 In	 Section	 4	 we	 discuss	 the	 paradox	 with	 special	 focus	 on	scientific	 models	 and	 present	 an	 alternative	 solution:	 rejecting	 literalism.	 We	argue	that	our	preferred	resolution	to	the	paradox	is	in	fact	suggested	by	Elgin’s	own	 account	 of	 scientific	 representation	 (Chapter	 12).	 In	 Section	 5	 we	 give	reasons	why	 the	 endorsement	 of	 non-literalism	might	 be	 preferable	 to	 Elgin’s	rejection	of	veritism.	Section	6	concludes.			
2.	Veritism	in	philosophy	of	science		Veritism	is	not	only	widespread	in	general	epistemology	(as	Elgin	documents	in	Chapter	 2);	 it	 is	 also	 the	 background	 position	 of	 much	 of	 contemporary	philosophy	of	science,	where	the	notions	of	truth	and	belief	chart	the	conceptual	landscape	 in	 the	 scientific	 realism	 vs.	 anti-realism	 debate.	 According	 to	 an	influential	definition	due	to	Psillos	(1999),	scientific	realism	is	characterized	by	three	“theses	(or	stances)”	(1999,	xvii).	The	metaphysical	stance	asserts	that	the	world	 has	 a	 mind-independent	 structure.	 The	 semantic	 stance	 insists	 that	 we	take	scientific	theories	at	face-value,	seeing	them	as	literal	descriptions	of	their	subject	matter	that	can	be	true	or	false.	The	epistemic	stance	urges	us	to	regard	mature	and	predictively	successful	theories	as	(at	least	approximately)	true.4																																																										4	This	 characterisation	 of	 scientific	 realism	 is	 widely	 used,	 as	 is	 documented	 in	 the	 article	 on	scientific	realism	in	the	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(Chakravartty	2017).	
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The	anti-realist	gives	up	at	least	one	of	these	commitments.	The	currently	most	prominent	 version	 of	 anti-realism	 is	 van	 Fraassen’s	 constructive	 empiricism	(1980).	 Constructive	 empiricism	 shares	 with	 realism	 the	 commitment	 to	 the	semantic	stance	and	insists	that	theories	should	be	taken	literally.	It	differs	from	realism	 in	 that	 the	 scope	 of	 appropriate	 belief	 recommended	 by	 the	 epistemic	stance	 is	 restricted:	we	 should	 only	 believe	what	 a	 successful	 scientific	 theory	tells	us	about	the	observable	world	(the	theory’s	observable	content),	while	we	should	remain	agnostic	about	what	it	tells	us	about	the	unobservable	world	(the	theory’s	 unobservable	 content).	 So	 although	 both	 a	 theory’s	 observable	 and	unobservable	 content	 can	 be	 true	 or	 false,	 our	 epistemic	 commitment	 only	concerns	the	former,	and	this	commitment	still	takes	the	form	of	belief.		Selective	realists	take	a	different	strategy.	In	an	attempt	to	meet	the	challenge	of	the	so-called	“pessimistic	meta-induction”	 they	aim	to	 isolate,	or	“select”,	 those	parts	 of	 a	 successful	 scientific	 theory	 that	 are,	 in	 some	 sense,	 essential	 in	generating	 the	observational	 content	of	 the	 theory	 (Harker	2012).	The	hope	 is	that	 it	 is	 these	parts	 that	are	preserved	across	 theory	change:	even	 if	a	mature	and	 empirically	 successful	 theory	 is	 given	 up,	whatever	 it	was	 that	 ensured	 it	was	 empirically	 successful	 in	 the	 first	 place	will	 be	 preserved	 in	 its	 successor,	and	it	is	this	part	of	the	theory	it	is	appropriate	to	believe.	For	structural	realists	this	 is	 the	 “structural	 content”	 of	 the	 theory	 (Worrall	 1989);	 for	 entity	 realists	this	 is	 commitment	 to	 the	 basic	 entities	 of	 the	 theory	 (Hacking	 1983).	Regardless,	however	the	essential	aspects	of	a	theory	are	identified,	these	should	go	 beyond	 the	 theory’s	 observational	 content	 in	 order	 to	 distinguish	 selective	realism	from	constructive	empiricism.			For	our	current	purposes	it	 is	crucial	to	note	that	 it	 is	still	 truth	and	belief	that	are	 the	 operating	 notions	 in	 defining	 the	 available	 positions	 in	 the	 debate.	Indeed,	different	versions	of	scientific	realism	and	the	currently	most	influential	version	 of	 anti-realism	 share	 a	 commitment	 to	 a	 literal	 understanding	 of	scientific	 theories	 and	 a	 focus	 on	 truth	 and	 belief.	 The	 commitment	 to	 Psillos’	semantic	 stance	 means	 that	 all	 parts	 of	 scientific	 theories	 are	 candidates	 for	truth.	The	debate	only	turns	on	whether	or	not	certain	parts	of	scientific	theories	can	be	 isolated	as	 the	appropriate	candidates	 for	belief,	and	on	whether	or	not	we	can	bracket	off	parts	of	 scientific	 theories	as	 those	 that	are	merely	used	as	working	posits.				Elgin’s	 challenge	 goes	 right	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 this	 debate.	 If	 veritism	 is	 to	 be	renounced	(and	with	it	a	commitment	to	belief,	knowledge,	and	assertion),	then	much	of	the	debate	over	realism	and	anti-realism	has	got	started	on	the	wrong	foot	 and	we	have	 to	 go	back	 to	 the	drawing	board	 and	 re-evaluate	 theories	 in	non-veritist	terms.	Such	a	re-evaluation	is	called	for	because	science	is	rife	with	parts	which	“if	interpreted	as	realistic	representations	of	their	referents	[…]	are	inaccurate	 in	 much	 the	 same	 way	 that	 false	 descriptions	 of	 an	 object	 are	inaccurate”	 (p.	 23).	 Elgin	 draws	 on	 a	wide	 range	 of	 examples	 to	 illustrate	 this	point,	 including	the	process	of	“curve	smoothing”	when	turning	raw	data	into	a	data	model	(p.	24),	ceteris	paribus	laws,	such	as	the	law	of	gravity	and	Snell’s	law	of	 refraction	 (p.	 25),	 stylised	 facts	 in	 economics	 (p.	 26),	 idealisations	 in	 the	
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context	 of	 modelling	 (p.	 27),	 and	 even	 Rawls’	 original	 position	 which	 models	political	citizens	as	mutually	disinterested	(pp.	27-28).			Starkly	 put	 then,	 the	 problem	 is	 the	 following:	 realists	 and	 anti-realists	 alike	accept	 some	 form	 of	 the	 semantic	 stance,	 which	 requires	 interpreting	 the	successful	part	of	science	literally,	but	many	successful	parts	of	science	are	false	thus	 interpreted,	 and	 hence	 it	 is	 not	 clear	whether,	 and	 if	 so	 how,	 the	 veritist	approach	 can	 accommodate	 them.	 This	 is	 a	 serious	 challenge	 for	 anybody	interested	in	scientific	realism.			In	the	remainder	of	this	paper	we	restrict	our	focus	to	model-based	science.	By	this	 we	 mean	 cases	 where	 scientists	 describe	 a	 secondary	 surrogate	 system,	which	 is	 then	 used	 to	 reason	 about	 the	 target	 (see	Weisberg	 2007).5	There	 is	little	 loss	 of	 generality	 in	 doing	 so.	 Thought	 experiments	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	particular	kinds	of	models	(Salis	and	Frigg	forthcoming),	and	models	are	usually	the	 sorts	 of	 things	 that	 are	 assumed	 to	 contain	 the	 idealisations	 that	 Elgin	 is	concerned	about	(Cartwright	1983).	Our	arguments	mutatis	mutandis	carry	over	to	other	cases	such	as	curve	fitting	and	ceteris	paribus	laws.				
3.	The	core	contradiction			The	 problem	 Elgin	 identifies	 for	 a	 philosophical	 account	 of	 science	 can	 be	presented	 as	 a	 paradox	 consisting	 of	 three	 individually	 attractive	 but	 jointly	inconsistent	propositions:		(i)	Veritism:	truth	is	necessary	for	epistemic	acceptability.	(ii)	Literalism:	the	claims	of	science	have	to	be	taken	literally.	(iii)	Much	 of	what	 science	 produces	 is	 literally	 false	 and	 yet	 it	 is	 epistemically	acceptable.		In	both	(i)	and	(iii)	we	adopt	Elgin’s	use	of	the	term	“acceptable”,	i.e.	“to	accept	that	p	involves	being	willing	to	take	p	as	a	premise,	as	a	basis	for	action	or	[…]	as	an	epistemic	norm	or	a	rule	of	inference,	when	one’s	ends	are	cognitive”	(p.	19).		Framing	 Elgin’s	 project	 as	 a	 paradox	 in	 this	 manner	 makes	 it	 clear	 how	significant	 the	 issue	 is.	 These	 three	 propositions	 cannot	 be	 held	 together.	 So	anyone	 who	 accepts	 (iii),	 which	 we	 take	 to	 be	 relatively	 unchallengeable	 for	reasons	 we	 discuss	 below,	 will	 have	 to	 deny	 at	 least	 one	 of	 (i)	 or	 (ii).	 This	underlying	 tension	 indicates	 just	how	 important	 the	 contemporary	discussions	concerning	 whether	 or	 not	 understanding	 and/or	 explanation	 are	 factive	 are	within	 the	 philosophy	 of	 science.	 Moreover,	 it	 demonstrates	 that	 these	discussions	 are	 inextricably	 intertwined	 with	 the	 debates	 over	 scientific	
																																																								5	In	recent	years	much	work	has	been	done	attempting	to	characterize	the	ontological	status	of	these	objects,	a	discussion	of	which	would	take	us	too	far	afield	here;	for	a	recent	review	of	these	endeavours	see	Gelfert’s	(2017).	For	our	current	purposes	it	suffices	to	think	of	them	as	abstract	objects	that	represent	their	targets	 in	a	manner	that	 is	analogous	to	the	way	in	which	concrete	models	 such	 as	 the	 Phillips-Newlyn	 machine	 (Morgan	 and	 Boumans	 2004)	 or	 ball-and-stick	models	of	molecules	(Toon	2011)	represent	their	target	systems.	
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representation	–	a	 fact	 that	has	not	yet	been	fully	appreciated	 in	the	 literature.	Our	question,	then,	is	to	consider	how	the	paradox	is	to	be	dissolved.6		The	 “eschatological”	 response	 to	 the	 paradox	 would	 be	 to	 give	 up	 on	 (iii).	Although	much	of	science	seemingly	relies	on	models	that,	if	interpreted	literally,	are	 false,	 this	 falsity	 should	 not	 be	 taken	 seriously	 because	 false	 models	 are	either	peripheral	or	ephemeral:	they	are	either	located	at	the	outer	edges	of	our	theoretical	 commitments,	 or	 they	 will	 be	 eliminated	 as	 science	 progresses	 in	favour	of	representations	that	meet	veritist	standards.			Elgin	dismisses	this	approach	as	untenable.	Our	scientific	understanding	is	built	on	idealisations,	and	these	cannot	be	dismissed	as	peripheral.		The	ideal	gas	law	is	central	to	our	understanding	of	thermodynamics	(p.	15);	the	Hardy-Weinberg	model	is	central	to	our	understanding	of	population	genetics	(p.	61);	and	so	on.	Likewise,	 there	 are	 no	 indications	 in	 current	 science	 that	 scientific	 progress	involves	 the	 elimination	 of	 idealisations,	 and	 falsehoods	 more	 generally.	Idealisation	 is	 not	 the	 hallmark	 of	 primitive	 science	 that	 gets	 eliminated	 as	research	 progresses;	 our	 best	 current	 theories	 involve	 them	 as	much	 as	 their	predecessors	 did.	 Hence	 the	 elimination	 of	 falsehoods	 like	 idealisations	 is	“neither	necessary	nor	obviously	desirable”	(p.	31).			Even	 if	 this	wasn’t	 the	 case,	 and	 problematic	models	were	 to	 be	 eliminated	 in	some	future	science,	it	remains	unclear	how	this	is	supposed	to	help	us	deal	with	the	 success	 of	 current	 mature	 and	 predictively	 accurate	 parts	 of	 science.	 The	realist’s	epistemic	stance	doesn’t	simply	advocate	that	some	ideal	future	science	should	 be	 considered	 (approximately)	 true;	 the	 realist	 advocates	 that	 our	current	mature	theories	should	be	thus	considered.	Elgin’s	position	is	explicitly	motivated	 by	 the	 requirement	 that	 a	 genuinely	 useful	 epistemology	 should	 be	able	 to	 accommodate	 the	 success	 of	 our	 current	 science	 –	 with	 all	 its	imperfections	(if	one	were	to	classify	idealisations	as	imperfections!)	–	not	some	hypothesized	 future	 science	 where	 everything	 is	 known	 about	 the	 world	 to	arbitrarily	detailed	levels	of	precision	(p.	31).	Banking	on	idealisations	dropping	out	 of	 the	picture	 in	 the	 future	 is	 not	 only	unfounded	 in	what	we	know	about	science;	it	also	fails	to	do	justice	to	the	epistemic	situation	we	are	currently	in.			We	 agree	 with	 Elgin	 that	 many	 of	 our	 best	 current	 theories	 contain	representations	 which,	 if	 understood	 literally,	 are	 inaccurate	 in	 various	 ways,	and	 that	 these	 representations	 are	 central	 to	 our	understanding	 of	 the	 subject	matter	 of	 these	 theories.	We	 also	 agree	 that	 an	 appropriate	 epistemology	 and	philosophy	of	science	should	be	equipped	to	account	for	their	cognitive	success.	So	 the	 eschatological	 response	 is	 untenable,	 and	 the	 contradiction	 has	 to	 be	resolved	by	either	renouncing	veritism	or	literalism.			As	we	have	previously	 seen,	Elgin	notes	 that	models	 are	 inaccurate	 if	 they	are	interpreted	 as	 realistic	 representations	 of	 their	 targets,	 which	 provides	 the	starting	 point	 for	 her	 project.	 So	 she	 accepts	 literalism	 and	 rejects	 veritism																																																									6	An	anonymous	referee	notes	 that	Giere’s	 (2009)	contribution	 to	Suárez’s	 (2009)	and	Suárez’s	(2010)	provide	related	discussions	regarding	whether	(iii)	is	compatible	with	scientific	realism.	
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(although	as	we	discuss	in	Section	5,	her	own	account	of	scientific	representation	is	 compatible	 with	 a	 rejection	 of	 literalism).	 This	 is	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 a	programme	 that	 aims	 to	 rehabilitate	 the	 use	 of	 falsehoods	 in	 science	 by	 de-emphasising	truth	(and	its	related	notions	of	belief	and	assertion)	and	assigning	non-factive	 understanding	 and	 felicitous	 falsehoods	 centre	 stage	 in	 the	epistemology	of	science.		It	bears	noting	that	Elgin	does	not	restrict	her	focus	on	the	benign	cases,	which,	even	though	strictly	false,	are	still	approximately	true.	Her	claim	is	more	radical:	not	 all	 false	 representations	 are	 approximately	 true,	 and	 even	 representations	that	 are	 radically	 false	 have	 epistemic	 value. 7 	Her	 examples	 for	 such	representations	are	the	Hardy-Weinberg	equation	in	population	genetics,	which	assumes	 that	 a	 population	 is	 infinite	 in	 order	 to	 screen	 off	 genetic	 drift,	 and	Rawls’	 original	 position,	which	 assumes	 that	 agents	 are	mutually	 disinterested	and	behind	a	 veil	 of	 ignorance	 (p.	 29).	These	 are	no	 exception.	One	might	 add	Ising’s	model	 of	 ferromagnetism,	 Kac’s	model	 of	macroscopic	 irreversibility	 in	the	presence	of	reversible	micro	dynamics,	classical	models	of	quantum	scarring,	Schelling’s	model	of	social	segregation,	and	Ackerlof’s	market	for	 lemons	to	the	list.			The	challenge	is	to	account	for	what	the	value	of	such	representations	is.	To	meet	this	challenge	Elgin	develops	an	intricate	and	finely	calibrated	epistemology	that	excises	the	traditional	epistemic	concepts.	It	replaces	the	notion	belief	with	that	of	acceptance,	 the	 notion	 of	assertion	 with	profession,	 the	 notion	 of	 knowledge	with	understanding,	and	it	explains	the	value	of	false	representations	in	terms	of	them	 being	 “felicitous	 falsehoods”.	 As	 noted	 above,	 to	 accept	 a	 proposition	 p	involves	“being	willing	to	take	p	as	a	premise,	as	a	basis	for	action	or,	[…]	as	an	epistemic	 norm	 or	 a	 rule	 of	 inference,	when	 one’s	 ends	 are	 cognitive”	 (p.	 19).	Relatedly,	given	the	connection	between	belief	and	assertion,	professing	that	p	is	“to	 make	 p	 available	 to	 function	 as	 a	 premise	 or	 rule	 of	 inference	 in	 a	 given	context	 for	 a	 given	 cognitive	 purpose”	 (p.	 21).	 A	 representation	 is	 a	 felicitous	falsehood	 if	 it	 is	 “an	 inaccurate	 representation	 whose	 inaccuracy	 does	 not	undermine	 its	 epistemic	 function”	 (p.	3).	The	epistemic	 function	of	models	 can	involve	affording	epistemic	access	to	a	representation’s	object	(p.	20),	serving	as	a	fruitful	working	hypotheses	(ibid.),	and,	first	and	foremost,	contributing	to	the	understanding	 that	 science	 supplies	 (p.	 1).	 Understanding	 does	 not	 concern	isolated	claims,	but	“a	topic,	discipline,	or	subject	matter”	(p.	43).	Understanding	is	holistic,	and	understanding	a	particular	matter	of	 fact	therefore	derives	from	being	able	to	place	this	fact	into	theoretical	context.	Having	an	understanding	of	such	 a	 context	means	 to	 have	 “an	 epistemic	 commitment	 to	 a	 comprehensive,	systematically	 linked	 body	 of	 information	 that	 is	 grounded	 in	 fact,	 is	 duly	responsive	 to	 reasons	or	evidence,	 and	enables	nontrivial	 inference,	 argument,	and	perhaps	action	regarding	the	topic	the	information	pertains	to”	(p.	44).8			
																																																								7	Elgin	does	not	discuss	the	well-known	issues	surrounding	how	to	define	approximate	truth	in	the	first	place	(Oddie	2016).	However,	she	does	seem	to	assume,	and	we	agree	with	her,	that	any	notion	 of	 approximate	 truth	will	 not	 be	 appropriate	 to	 capture	 the	 epistemic	 value	 of	 at	 least	some	models	(when	interpreted	literally).				8	Understanding	has	several	dimensions.	See	Baumberger	and	Brun’s	(2017)	for	an	analysis.		
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Let	us	illustrate	this	approach	with	one	of	Elgin’s	own	examples.	Suppose	we	use	the	Hardy–Weinberg	model	to	understand	how	gene	frequencies	change	during	evolutionary	processes.	The	model	works	by	considering	an	 infinite	population	reproducing	at	random	where	two	alleles	A	and	a	compete	at	a	single	locus.	For	a	particular	 generation,	 i,	we	 let	 GAAi 	be	 the	 proportion	 of	 AA	 individuals,	 and	likewise	 for	 Gaai 	and	 GAai .	 We	 can	 then	 define	 the	 proportion	 of	 alleles	 in	 that	generation	 as	 p = Gi AA + 0.5GiaA 	for	A	and	 q = Giaa + 0.5GiaA 	for	a.	Using	 this	 one	can	compute	the	expected	values	of	genotypes	for	the	following	generation:			
 
Gi+1AA = p
2 ,
Gi+1aA = 2 pq,
Gi+1aa = q
2
	
		For	 this	 result	 to	 hold,	 it	 is	 crucial	 that	 the	 population	 is	 infinite	 (to	 avoid	“genetic	 drift”,	 i.e.	 a	 random	 event	which	 just	 so	 happens	 to	 disproportionally	affect	 the	 frequency	of	one	of	 the	alleles),	and	also	 that	mating	 is	 random,	 that	there	is	no	mutation,	that	there	is	no	fitness	benefit	for	any	genotype,	as	well	as	a	few	 other	 assumptions	 (for	 details	 see	 Templeton’s	 (2006,	 Chapter	 2)).	 It’s	plausible	 that	many	 of	 the	 populations	 of	 interest	 do	 not	 exhibit	 any	 of	 these	characteristics	(and	none	are	infinite!).	And	yet	the	model	plays	a	central	role	in	our	understanding	of	gene	frequencies	in	a	population	and	their	evolution.					On	Elgin’s	approach	this	makes	the	model	a	“felicitous	falsehood”:		 The	model	 is	 no	 approximation.	 Populations	 are	 not	 nearly	 infinite	 (whatever	that	might	mean).	Mating	 is	not	nearly	random.	However	 indiscriminate	actual	mating	behavior	 is,	physical	proximity	 is	required.	 In	the	 long	run,	mating	only	with	nearby	partners	promotes	genetic	drift.	Natural	selection	and	genetic	drift	are	ubiquitous.	Migration	is	widespread.	Mutation	and	random	fluctuations	are,	in	real	life,	unavoidable.	Still,	to	understand	the	effects	of	evolution,	it	is	useful	to	consider	 what	 would	 happen	 in	 its	 absence.	 By	 devising	 and	 deploying	 an	epistemically	felicitous	falsehood,	biologists	find	out	(p.	29).		Furthermore,		 [i]nasmuch	as	evolutionary	pressures	are	always	present,	the	model	cannot,	nor	does	 it	pretend	to,	account	 for	allele	distribution	generally.	 It	 is,	however,	very	useful	 for	 some	 purposes.	 If	 population	 geneticists	 want	 to	 understand	 how	significant	 an	 evolutionary	 factor	 such	 as	 migration	 is,	 they	 need	 a	 base	 rate.	They	 need,	 that	 is,	 to	 know	 how	 alleles	 would	 redistribute	 in	 its	 absence	 (p.	263).		So	the	model	provides	understanding	concerning	the	relationships	between	each	of	 these	 features	 and	 the	 role	 they	 play	 in	 determining	 the	 allele	 distribution	across	 a	 population.	 Understanding,	 say,	 the	 role	 a	 particular	 historical	 event	(e.g.	 how	 a	 population	 became	 isolated	 into	 two	 subpopulations)	 played	 in	
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shaping	 the	allele	 frequencies	 in	a	population	might	require	understanding	 the	various	 interconnections	between	each	of	 these	 features.	The	Hardy–Weinberg	model	 provides	 the	 base	 case	 to	 which	 divergences	 can	 be	 compared.	 It	contributes	 to	 how	 population	 geneticists	 can	 try	 to	 isolate	 the	 effect	 of	 each	feature,	and	thus	 links	 them	together	 into	a	holistic	web	of	understanding.	The	fact	 that	 it	 contains	 an	 infinite	 number	 of	 organisms	 is	 vital	 for	 the	model	 to	generate	the	results	that	it	does,	and	yet	it	also	makes	the	model	false.	Scientists	using	 the	 model	 can	 accept	 it	 for	 a	 certain	 theoretical	 investigation	 (to	understand	the	role	some	other	feature	played,	say)	without	believing	it.	When	they	apply	it,	they	don’t	assert	that	it	holds	of	the	target	but	they	might	profess	that	 it	 does.	 And	 the	 model’s	 falsity	 doesn’t	 stop	 it	 playing	 an	 important	epistemic	 function,	 even	 if,	when	 applied	 to	 an	 actual	 target	 system,	 it	 doesn’t	provide	 “knowledge”	 (at	 least	 if	 interpreted	 literally	 as	 representing	 the	actual	population	as	being	 infinite).	This	 function	contributes	to	our	understanding	 in	the	sense	that	the	model	illuminates	the	connections	between	different	effects	on	allele	distributions.			This	 short	 sketch	 cannot	 do	 justice	 to	 the	 complexity	 and	 depth	 of	 Elgin’s	epistemology,	nor	can	it	shed	light	on	its	implications	for	important	issues	such	a	holism,	 nonfactivism,	 epistemic	 normativity,	 and	 reflective	 equilibrium.	 These	topics	 will	 have	 to	 be	 dealt	 with	 in	 future	 in-depth	 discussion	 of	 Elgin’s	epistemology.	 Our	 aim	 here	 is	 a	 different	 one.	 We	 aim	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	motivations	 for	 her	 project,	 in	 particular	 the	 connection	 between	 these	 far-reaching	 reconfigurations	 of	 epistemology	 and	 the	 underlying	 assumptions	concerning	 how	 scientific	 models,	 which	 are	 false	 if	 interpreted	 literally,	represent.	To	this	end	we	now	investigate	the	third	option	of	resolving	the	above	contradiction,	namely	to	reject	literalism.				
4.	Rejecting	literalism		
	Scientific	models,	which	play	an	important	role	in	Elgin’s	rejection	of	veritivism,	are	 in	 need	 of	 interpretation	 before	 they	 can	 be	 said	 to	 be	 false	 or	 inaccurate	representations.	The	question	then,	is	how	are	such	models	interpreted?	In	this	section	we	outline	Elgin’s	own	account	of	scientific	representation	(Chapter	12),	and	then	show	how	it	can	be	brought	to	bear	in	the	context	of	idealised	models.9	We	then	argue	that	even	by	Elgin’s	own	lights,	idealised	models	do	not	have	to	be	interpreted	 as	 false	 or	 inaccurate	 representations	 of	 their	 targets.	 Thus,	somewhat	surprisingly,	her	own	account	of	scientific	representation	can	actually	be	utilized	to	motivate	a	rejection	of	literalism	in	a	manner	which	dissolves	the	core	 contradiction	 of	 the	 previous	 section,	 thereby	 undermining	 the	 main	motivation	for	anti-veritivism.																																																											9	We	note	that	her	account	of	representation	in	True	Enough	is	continuous	with	at	least	some	of	her	earlier	work	on	representation	(Elgin	2009,	2010).	It	is	an	interesting	exegetic	question	how	it	relates	to	her	even	earlier	work,	which	places	less	of	an	emphasis	on	the	idea	that	science	is	a	model-based	 practice.	 Unfortunately	 space	 considerations	 prevent	 us	 from	 discussing	 the	historical	development	of	her	thought.			
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As	 noted	 in	 Section	 2,	modelling	 involves	 introducing	 a	 secondary	 system,	 the	model,	which	is	then	used	to	reason	about	the	target.	Models	can	be	the	vehicles	of	 surrogative	 reasoning	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 models	 represent	 their	 target	systems.	What	motivates	the	core	contradiction	drawn	out	of	Elgin’s	work	is	that	models	are	central	to	our	understanding	of	their	target	systems,	but	nevertheless	are	 not	 (approximately)	 “true”	 or	 “accurate”	 representations	 of	 their	 targets.10	But	what	does	it	mean	to	call	a	model	an	inaccurate	representation?	To	answer	this	question	we	need	to	establish	what	makes	a	model	accurate	or	 inaccurate,	and	indeed	what	makes	a	model	a	representation	in	the	first	place.	Considered	as	“bare”	objects,	model	systems	(such	as	a	system	of	water	pipes	or	a	collection	of	perfect	 spheres)	 have	 no	 representational	 properties.	 They	 are	 just	 objects,	either	concrete	or	abstract.	The	challenge	then,	is	to	account	for	what	it	takes	to	turn	a	model	 system	 into	a	 representation	of	 a	 target,	 and	how	 this	 suffices	 to	understand	the	representational	accuracy	of	a	given	model.			Thinking	 about	 models	 as	 representations	 in	 these	 terms,	 “literalism”	 can	 be	associated	with	accounts	of	scientific	representation	according	to	which	models	are	 “intended	 copies”	 of	 their	 targets,	 at	 least	 in	 certain	 respects	 (which	 can	include	 structural	 ones)	 and	 to	 certain	 degrees.	 Among	 the	 accounts	 of	representation	 that	enshrine	 this	 idea	are	 similarity	and	structural	 accounts	of	representation.11	Similarity	 accounts	 are	 based	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 a	 model	accurately	 represents	 its	 target	 by	 being	 similar	 to	 it,	 where	 similarity	 is	explained	 in	 terms	 of	 model	 and	 target	 sharing	 certain	 features.	 Structural	accounts	are	based	on	the	same	idea,	but	further	narrow	the	focus	on	structural	features.	 Literalism	 is	 then	 the	 claim	 that	 models	 have	 to	 be	 interpreted	 as	sharing	 features	 with	 their	 targets	 in	 order	 to	 be	 accurate	 representations	 of	those	 features.	Veritism	is	 the	claim	 that	only	models	 that	accurately	 represent	features	of	their	targets	are	epistemically	acceptable.	In	this	context,	premise	(iii)	is	 the	 claim	 that	 there	 are	 many	 scientific	 models	 that	 are	 epistemically	acceptable	 despite	 having	 features	 that	 play	 an	 essential	 role	 in	 defining	 the	model	 but	which	 are	 nevertheless	 explicitly	 not	 shared	with	 their	 targets.	 The	population	in	the	Hardy-Weinberg	model	is	infinite,	as	is	the	lattice	in	the	Ising	model.	These	features	are	not	shared	with	the	target	(which	is	finite)	and	yet	the	models	 are	 acceptable.	 In	 these	 terms,	 retaining	 veritism	 and	 (iii)	 requires	 an	account	of	scientific	representation	that	allows	for	non-literal	interpretations	of	scientific	models.			Elgin	herself	 (Chapter	12)	provides	an	account	of	 scientific	 representation	 that	she	takes	to	be	a	literalist	account,	and	as	result	the	models	she	focuses	on	come	out	 as	 falsehoods.	 Since	we	 are	 going	 to	 argue	 that	 Elgin’s	 account	 can	 be	 re-interpreted	as	a	non-literalist	account	that	can	in	fact	be	utilised	to	undercut	her	own	motivation	for	giving	up	on	veritism,	it	is	worth	spelling	it	out	in	detail	here.																																																									10	We	 use	 the	 terms	 “accurate”	 and	 “inaccurate”	 rather	 than	 “truth”	 or	 “falsity”	 when	 talking	about	model-based	science.	This	is	in	line	with	much	of	the	literature	where	models	are,	strictly	speaking,	 not	 considered	 truth-bearers	 since	 they	 are	 non-linguistic.	 For	 opposing	 views	 see	Mäki	 (2011),	who	 thinks	 that	models	 should	 be	 understood	 as	 truth-bears	 despite	 being	 non-linguistic,	and	Toon	(2012)	and	Levy	(2015)	who	understand	models	linguistically.	11	Here	 is	not	 the	place	 to	delve	 into	 the	details	of	 these	accounts.	For	reviews	and	discussions	see	our	(2016b,	2017a).	
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According	 to	 her,	 we	 should	 think	 of	 scientific	 representation	 in	 terms	 of	“representation-as”.12	A	 representation	 x,	 e.g.	 a	 model,	 a	 picture,	 a	 caricature,	represents	 a	 target	 y,	 e.g.	 a	 magnet,	 a	 landscape,	 a	 politician,	 as	 z,	 e.g.	 as	undergoing	 a	 phase	 transition,	 as	 foreboding,	 as	 a	 bulldog.	 Elgin’s	 account	 of	representation-as	 has	 three	 components:	 denotation,	 exemplification,	 and	
imputation.			Denotation	establishes	representation-of:	symbol	x	 is	a	representation-of	y	 iff	x	denotes	y.	Denotation	 is	 the	relation	 that	holds	between	a	name	and	 its	bearer	and	between	 a	 predicate	 and	 the	 objects	 in	 its	 extension.	 Likewise	 “[p]ictures,	equations,	graphs,	charts,	and	maps	represent	their	subjects	by	denoting	them”	(p.	 251).	 This	 extends	 to	 scientific	 models:	 what	 makes	 models	 “about”	 their	targets	in	the	first	place	is	that	they	denote	them.	It’s	worth	noting	here	that	in	order	 for	 a	 model	 to	 denote	 a	 target,	 the	 latter	 must	 exist.	 This	 raises	 the	problem	of	models	with	 non-existent	 targets.	 Examples	 of	 such	models	 can	 be	drawn	from	the	history	of	science	–	models	of	the	ether,	caloric,	or	phlogiston	–	as	 well	 as	 from	 current	 investigations	 where	 some	 models	 are	 introduced	without	 the	 aim	 of	 representing	 any	 system	 in	 the	 world	 –	 Norton’s	 Dome	(Norton	2003)	or	n-sex	models	 for	n>2	 (Weisberg	2013).	The	 latter	 are	better	understood	as	facilitating	reasoning	about	the	concepts	of	the	theories	in	which	they	are	embedded	rather	than	any	system	in	the	world.	Elgin’s	general	theory	of	representation	 has	 a	 way	 of	 accommodating	 such	 models.	 Just	 as	 we	 classify	paintings	depicting	non-existent	animals	or	landscapes	as	griffin-representations	or	minotaur-representations	despite	the	fact	they	don’t	denote	anything,	we	can	classify	 caloric	 models	 as	 caloric-representations	 or	 n-sex	 models	 as	 n-sex-population-representations	 despite	 containing	 more	 than	 two	 sexes	 of	organisms	(p.	252).	 In	general,	being	a	z-representation	does	not	entail	being	a	representation-of	a	z.	These	can	come	together.	For	example,	a	2-sex-population-representation	can	also	be	a	representation-of	an	actual	population.	But	they	can	also	 come	 apart	 in	 different	 ways.	 A	 caloric-representation	 is	 not	 a	representation-of	 caloric	 (because	 caloric	 doesn’t	 exist),	 and	 the	 name	“Catherine”	 is	 a	 representation-of	 a	 person	 despite	 not	 being	 a	 person-representation.		Denotation	alone	is	not	sufficient	for	the	sort	of	relationship	that	holds	between	models	and	their	 targets,	or	paintings	and	their	subjects,	and	so	on.	 In	general,	what	we	call	“epistemic	representations”	can	be	used	to	(attempt	to)	learn	about	their	targets.	By	reasoning	about	certain	features	of	the	representation,	one	can	draw	inferences	(which	may	be	false)	about	the	target	system.13	That	x	denotes	y	does	 not,	 by	 itself,	 accommodate	 this	 sort	 of	 relationship;	 reasoning	 about																																																									12	We	 note	 here	 that	 ‘representation-as’	 has	 also	 been	 employed	 by	 Hughes	 (1997)	 and	 van	Fraassen	 (2008)	 in	 discussions	 of	 scientific	 representation.	 For	 the	 latter	 in	 particular,	 it	 is	 an	open	 question	 about	 how	 he	 accommodates	 discussions	 of	 idealisation	 and	 representation-as	within	his	broadly	structural	understanding	of	representation.	Whilst	he	is	sensitive	to	the	role	of	distortions	in	model-based	science	(2008,	Chapter	1),	he	is	not	explicit	about	the	role	that	these	play	 in	 establishing	 structural	 relationships	 between	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 phenomena	 and	 the	structure	of	the	model	(2008,	Chapter	11).		13 	We	 include	 the	 parenthetical	 “(attempt	 to)”	 and	 “(which	 may	 be	 false)”	 to	 allow	 that	representations	may	misrepresent.	For	more	on	this	distinction	see	Section	1	of	our	(2016b).	
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features	of	a	name	or	a	predicate	does	not	allow	someone	to	draw	any	inferences	about	the	bearer	of	that	name	or	predicate.			Moreover,	notice	 that	when	we	do	draw	 inferences	using	models,	 or	 epistemic	representations	more	generally,	 these	 inferences	do	not	concern	all	 features	of	the	representation.	The	fact	that	the	population	in	the	Hardy-Weinberg	model	is	infinite	 is	 relevant	 to	which	 inferences	 it	 licenses,	 the	 fact	 that	we	 distinguish	between	alleles	using	upper	case	and	lower	case	letters,	rather	than	some	other	lexicographic	scheme,	is	not.	So,	in	addition	to	denotation,	we	need	to	account	for	the	facts	(a)	that	certain	features	of	the	model	systems	are	the	relevant	ones	and	(b)	that	by	reasoning	about	these	features	a	model	user	can	generate	inferences	concerning	the	subject	of	the	representation.			To	 accommodate	 these	 aspects	 of	 scientific	 representation	 Elgin	 invokes	 the	notion	of	exemplification,	which	is	a	relation	that	holds	between	an	exemplar	and	the	 property	 or	 feature	 that	 it	 is	 an	 exemplar	 of.	 An	 exemplar	 “functions	 as	 a	symbol	that	makes	reference	to	some	of	the	properties,	patterns,	or	relations	it	instantiates”	 (p.	 184;	 see	 also	 Goodman	 1976	 and	 Elgin	 1996).	 Samples	 are	 a	simple	example	of	items	that	represent	via	exemplification.	The	pieces	of	cloth	in	the	tailor’s	fabric	sample	book	exemplify	their	colour,	shine,	and	texture,	and	the	olive	we	 try	 at	 the	market	 exemplifies	 its	 flavour.	 Following	 Elgin	we	 use	 the	phrase	“exemplified	feature”	to	refer	to	any	property,	relation,	or	pattern	that	an	exemplar	instantiates	and	refers	to.	There	are	no	restrictions	on	these	features;	they	can	be	“static	or	dynamic,	monadic	or	relational,	and	may	be	at	any	level	of	generality	 or	 abstraction”	 (p.	 185).	 There	 are	 two	 conditions	 to	 be	met	 for	 an	object	x	to	 exemplify	 a	 feature	F:	x	must	 instantiate	F,	 and	x	must	 additionally	refer	to	F.	A	crucial	aspect	of	exemplars	is	that	they	afford	epistemic	access	to	the	features	 they	 exemplify:	 “By	 exemplifying	 a	 feature	 –	 by	 highlighting	 or	displaying	 that	 feature	 –	 an	 exemplar	 affords	 epistemic	 access	 to	 it.	 Someone	who	properly	interprets	the	exemplar	is	in	a	position	to	recognize	the	feature	in	question”	(p.	260).	We	can	see	this	in	action	in	the	way	in	which	fabric	samples	exemplify	 their	 textures	 (amongst	 other	 features).	 The	 sample	 instantiates	 its	texture,	and	it	does	so	in	such	a	way	that	the	texture	is	highlighted	and	referred	back	to.	Because	the	sample	exemplifies	its	texture	we	can	use	it	to	reason	about	other	things	which	also	instantiate	that	feature,	e.g.	a	piece	of	clothing	made	out	of	the	type	of	fabric	in	question.		Tying	these	aspects	of	exemplification	together	with	denotation	leads	to	Elgin’s	account	of	representation-as:		 when	 x	 represents	y	 as	 z,	 x	 is	 a	 z-representation	 that	as	such	 denotes	y.	We	 are	now	in	a	position	to	cash	out	the	‘as	such’.	It	is	because	x	is	a	z-representation	that	
x	denotes	y	as	it	does.	x	does	not	merely	happen	to	denote	y	and	happen	to	be	a	z-representation.	 Rather,	 in	 being	 a	 z-representation,	 x	 exemplifies	 certain	properties	 and	 imputes	 those	 properties	 or	 related	 ones	 to	 y	 (p.	 260,	 original	emphasis).		This	 account	 applies	 to	 models,	 and	 it	 accounts	 for	 (a)	 and	 (b)	 above.	 What	makes	 a	 feature	 of	 a	 model	 relevant	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 generating	 inferences	about	 its	 target	 system	 is	 that	 the	 model	 exemplifies	 that	 feature.	 And	 what	
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explains	 how	 a	model	 can	 be	 used	 to	 generate	 an	 inference	 about	 its	 target	 is	that	 a	model	 user	 gains	 epistemic	 access	 to	 the	 exemplified	 features,	 and	 then	imputes	 those	 features	 to	 the	 target	 system	 by	 taking	 the	 target	 to	 be	 in	 the	extension	 of	 the	 exemplified	 feature.	 In	 Elgin’s	 words:	 “models	 exemplify	features	they	share	with	their	targets	and	impute	those	features	to	their	targets.	Where	they	are	successful,	they	afford	epistemic	access	to	aspects	of	their	targets	that	we	might	otherwise	miss”	(p.	262).			Understood	 in	 this	 way,	 we	 can	 see	 why	 Elgin’s	 account	 of	 representation-as	paves	 the	 way	 for	 a	 literal	 interpretation	 of	 scientific	 models:	 models	 are	understood	 as	 representing	 their	 targets	 as	 having	 certain	 features	 that	 the	models	 themselves	exemplify	 (and	 therefore	 instantiate).	 In	 this	 sense,	despite	Elgin’s	 arguments	 against	 resemblance	 views	 of	 representation,	 her	 account	could	be	seen	as	a	developed	version	of	it,	and	she	notes	this	possibility	herself:		 for	x	to	exemplify	a	property	of	y,	x	must	share	that	property	with	y.	So	x	and	y	must	be	alike	in	respect	of	that	property.	It	might	seem,	then,	that	resemblance	in	 particular	 respects	 is	what	 is	 required	 to	 connect	 a	 representation	with	 its	referent	 […].	There	 is	a	grain	of	 truth	here.	 If	 exemplification	 is	 the	vehicle	 for	representation-as,	 the	 representation	 and	 its	 object	 resemble	 one	 another	 in	respect	of	the	exemplified	properties	(p.	261-62).		It	is	this	interpretation	of	her	account	that	underlies	a	literalist	interpretation	of	models	 according	 to	 which	 a	 model	 that	 has	 a	 relevant	 property	 that	 is	 not	shared	with	the	target	is	a	falsehood.				However,	 even	when	discussing	 this	account,	Elgin	 is	 sensitive	 to	 the	 idea	 that	target	systems	needn’t	instantiate	the	exact	feature	exemplified	by	the	model	in	order	 for	the	model	to	be	successful.	 In	 fact,	 the	definition	of	representation-as	quoted	above	states	that	x	imputes	exemplified	features	or	related	ones	to	y,	and	she	 emphasizes	 that	 “or	 relates	 ones”	 is	 crucial	 (p.	 260).	 In	 benign	 cases	 the	features	 instantiated	 in	 the	 target	 are	 not	 off	 by	 much	 and	 the	 divergence	 is	negligible	 (p.	 261).	 In	 other	 cases	 the	 discrepancy	 is	 more	 significant.	 Elgin	provides	the	following	example:		 A	 caricature	 that	 exaggerates	 the	 size	of	 its	 subject’s	 nose	need	not	 impute	 an	enormous	 nose	 to	 its	 subject.	 By	 exemplifying	 the	 size	 of	 the	 nose,	 it	 focuses	attention,	thereby	orienting	its	audience	to	the	way	the	subject’s	nose	dominates	his	 face	 or,	 through	 a	 chain	 of	 reference,	 the	 way	 his	 nosiness	 dominates	 his	character	(p.	260).		In	this	example	the	caricature	exemplifies	the	feature	of	having	a	large	nose.	But	it’s	explicitly	not	this	feature	that	is	imputed	to	the	target.	Rather	the	feature	is	connected,	via	a	“chain	of	reference”,	to	a	“related	one”,	nosiness	as	a	character	trait,	 and	 it’s	 this	 trait,	 not	 the	 feature	 literally	 exemplified	 by	 the	 caricature,	which	is	imputed	onto	the	target.			The	same	happens	with	scientific	models,	which	can	exemplify	features	that	are	not	 themselves	 imputed	 to	 the	 target.	The	question	 then	 is	whether	or	not	we	can	further	explicate	what	it	means	for	a	model	that	exemplifies	some	feature	F	
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to	 impute	 a	 feature	 G,	 which	 is	 related	 to	 F,	 to	 the	 target.	 Relations	 can	 be	multifarious	 and	 so	 there	 is	 no	 general	 account	 of	what	 “related	 ones”	means.	However,	 it	would	seem	important	 to	give	 the	possibility	of	 imputing	a	related	property	G	a	clearly	demarcated	space	in	an	account	of	representation.	For	this	reason	 we	 incorporate	 into	 our	 DEKI	 account	 the	 requirement	 that	 scientific	representations	need	to	come	with	keys	which	explicitly	specify	 the	connection	between	the	feature	exemplified	by	a	model	and	the	features	to	be	imputed	to	a	target	 system.	 A	 key	 essentially	 is	 a	 rule	 of	 association	 that	 correlates	 every	exemplified	feature	F	of	the	model	with	a	feature	G	that	is	imputed	to	the	target.	We	 can	 then	 say	 that	model	M	 is	 z-representation	 of	 target	T	 iff	 the	 following	conditions	hold	(Frigg	and	Nguyen	2018,	p.	220):14		 1. M	denotes	T.	2. M	exemplifies	z-properties	F1, ...,Fn .	3. M	 comes	with	key	K	 associating	 the	set	{F1, ..., Fn} 	with	a	set	of	properties
{G1, ...,Gm} .	4. M	imputes	at	least	one	of	the	properties	 G1, ...,Gm to	T.		In	some	cases	these	keys	might	be	the	identity	(which	would	amount	to	a	literal	interpretation	 of	 a	 model,	 i.e.	 a	 model	 which	 exemplifies	 some	 feature	 F	 and	represents	 its	 target	 as	 having	F),	 but	 in	 other	 cases	 the	 imputed	 features	 can	diverge	 from	 the	 exemplified	 features,	 which	 would	 be	 a	 non-literal	 way	 of	interpreting	the	model.	Non-literal	interpretations	are	common.		Consider	a	map	of	 the	 world.	 It	 exemplifies	 a	 distance	 of	 (roughly)	 40cm	 between	 the	 points	labelled	 “Chicago”	 and	 “London”.	 The	 cartographic	 key	 the	 map	 comes	 with	includes	 a	 scale	 –	 1	 mm	 :	 10	 miles	 –	 which	 allows	 us	 to	 translate	 a	 feature	exemplified	 by	 the	 map	 to	 a	 feature	 of	 the	 world:	 that	 there	 is	 a	 distance	 of	(roughly)	 4000	miles	 between	 Chicago	 and	 London.	 Someone	who	 imputes	 to	the	world	 the	 feature	 that	 Chicago	 and	London	 are	40cm	apart	 simply	doesn’t	understand	how	a	map	works.		The	 importance	of	keys	can	also	be	seen	with	another	every-day	object:	a	car’s	wing	 mirror.	 Mirrors	 provide	 epistemic	 representations.	 In	 fact	 mirrors	 are	paradigmatic	examples	of	such	representations.	By	reasoning	about	the	features	of	the	mirror	image	we	can	reason	about	the	features	of	the	object	shown	in	the	mirror.	 In	 the	case	of	car’s	wing	mirror	we	can	 learn	about	 the	cars	behind	us,	and	 about	 the	 traffic	 situation	 to	 the	 side	 and	 rear	more	 generally.	 The	 image	denotes	the	relevant	area,	and	exemplifies	various	features:	whether	or	not	there	is	a	car	in	the	mirror,	the	distance	between	the	car	in	the	mirror	and	the	side	of	door	panel	 in	 the	mirror,	and	so	on.	But	a	wing	mirror	 is	a	convex	mirror,	and	unlike	 the	 straight	 mirrors	 that	 one	 usually	 finds	 in	 bathrooms,	 such	 mirrors	make	objects	appear	smaller	than	they	are.	If	one	looks	in	the	wing	mirror	and	infers	that	the	car	behind	is	as	far	away	as	it	appears	in	the	mirror,	one	makes	a	fatal	error.	The	car	is	in	fact	much	closer!																																																											14	For	more	on	the	DEKI	account	and	the	relationship	it	shares	with	Goodman	and	Elgin’s	account	of	representation	see	our	(2017b).	
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Car	manufacturers	are	worried	 that	drivers	make	 the	 interpretative	mistake	 to	think	 that	 the	 car	mirror	works	 just	 like	 their	 bathroom	mirror	 and	 therefore	often	 deliver	mirrors	 engraved	with	 the	warning	 “objects	 in	mirror	 are	 closer	than	 they	 appear”.	 On	 our	 account	 of	 scientific	 representation	 this	 warning	works	as	a	key.	The	key	tells	us	to	translate	the	exemplified	distance	features	in	the	 mirror	 image	 into	 another	 distance	 feature	 to	 be	 imputed	 to	 the	 actual	situation	 on	 the	 road.	 In	 fact,	 the	 mirror’s	 warning	 explicitly	 councils	 the	interpreter	against	 a	 literal	 interpretation	of	 the	epistemic	representation.	And	in	 doing	 so	 allows	 for	 a	 translation	 between	 the	 features	 exemplified	 by	 the	representation	and	 the	 features	 imputed	 to	 the	 target.	Once	 this	 is	understood	the	 image	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 felicitous	 falsehood,	 and	 it	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	literally	 accurate	 representation	 of	 the	 target	 (but	 only	 if	 interpreted	 non-literally).			Models	need	to	be	keyed	up	in	the	same	way.	Consider	the	case	of	a	scale	model	of	a	boat	being	used	to	represent	the	forces	an	actual	boat	faces	when	moving	at	sea.	 The	 exemplified	 feature	 in	 this	 instance	 is	 the	 resistance	 the	 model	 boat	faces	when	dragged	through	a	tank	of	water.	But	this	doesn’t	 translate	 into	the	water	 resistance	 faced	 by	 the	 actual	 boat	 in	 a	 straightforward	 manner.	 The	resistance	of	the	model	and	the	resistance	of	the	real	boat	stand	in	a	complicated	non-linear	 relationship	 because	 smaller	 objects	 encounter	 disproportionate	effects	due	to	the	viscosity	of	the	fluid.	The	exact	form	of	the	key	is	often	highly	non-trivial	and	emerges	as	the	result	of	a	thoroughgoing	study	of	the	situation.	Other	models	work	with	limit	keys.	The	Ising	model	of	a	ferromagnetic	substance	instantiates	infinity	(in	the	sense	that	it’s	an	infinitely	extended	lattice).	But	we	don’t	 impute	 this	 feature	 to	 the	 magnet;	 we	 impute	 being	 large	 enough	 for	boundary	 effects	 to	 be	 negligible.	 When	 using	 the	 Hardy-Weinberg	 model	 we	needn’t	 impute	being	an	infinite	population	mating	at	random	to	the	target,	we	can	impute	being	large	enough	for	effects	of	genetic	drift	to	be	negligible,	which	implies	 that	we	 should	expect	 the	genotype	distribution	 to	be	around	 (but	not	necessarily	 exactly)	 the	 one	 given	 by	 the	 equations	 in	 Section	 3.	 When	 using	Schelling’s	model	to	target	social	segregation	we	don’t	impute	being	set	on	a	grid	with	 no	 cost	 of	moving	 to,	 say,	 residential	 patterns	 in	 Chicago;	we	 impute	 the	claim	 that	 even	 a	 relatively	 “low”	 preferences	 regarding	 how	 many	 of	 one’s	neighbours	one	wants	to	be	similar	to	oneself	can	yield	global	segregation.	And	so	on.	Determining	how	to	move	from	features	exemplified	by	models	to	features	of	their	target	systems	can	be	a	significant	task,	and	should	not	go	unrecognized	in	an	account	of	scientific	representation,	or	indeed	scientific	practice	generally.		There	 is	 one	 big	 difference	 between	 wing	 mirrors	 and	 models:	 models,	 even	though	 they	require	a	key,	 rarely,	 if	ever,	 come	with	warnings	written	on	 their	sleeves.	Models	are,	as	it	were,	mirrors	without	warnings!	It	may	be	a	matter	of	some	 compunction	 that	models	 usually	 don’t	 come	with	 explicit	 keys,	 and	one	might	wish	 that	 scientists	were	more	 explicit	 about	 them.	However,	 not	 being	made	 explicit	 should	 not	 be	 mistaken	 for	 being	 absent.	 No	 one	 with	 any	understanding	 of	 mechanics	 thinks	 that	 a	 Newtonian	 model	 imputes	 “being	 a	point	particle”	to	the	sun;	nor	need	an	electromagnetic	model	impute	backward	causation	to	a	moving	charge.	The	key	is	often	implicit	in	a	scientific	practice,	and	
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students	 learn	how	to	 interpret	models	on	the	 job.	Yet,	an	 implicit	key	 is	still	a	key.			It	now	transpires	how	the	introduction	of	the	key	serves	to	allow	for	non-literal	interpretations	 of	 scientific	 models,	 and	 thus	 how	 it	 dissolves	 the	 core	contradiction.	Yes,	scientific	models	are	idealised	representations	of	their	target	systems.	 And	 yes,	 if	 interpreted	 literally	 they	 deliver	 falsehoods	 which	 are	 in	tension	with	the	idea	that	they	offer	us	understanding	of	their	subject	matter,	at	least	 if	 understanding	 is	 construed	 factively.	 This	 puts	 pressure	 on	 an	epistemology	and	philosophy	of	science	that	takes	truth	as	a	necessary	condition	for	epistemic	acceptability.	But	rather	than	give	up	on	veritism,	one	can	instead	give	up	on	 the	 idea	 that	models	have	 to	be	 interpreted	 literally.	 Just	because	a	model	exemplifies	an	infinite	number	of	individuals,	this	feature	does	not	have	to	be	 interpreted	 as	 holding	 in	 the	 actual	 population.	 Just	 because	 the	 idealised	pendulum	exemplifies	being	subject	to	no	air	resistance	or	friction,	it	needn’t	be	taken	to	represent	the	actual	pendulum	in	the	grandfather	clock	in	your	office	as	being	 subject	 to	 no	 air	 resistance	 or	 friction.	 Rather,	 it	 represents	 the	 clock	mechanism	 as	 being	 such	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 those	 aspects	 is	 negligible	 for	ordinary	 time-keeping.	 In	 this	way	 one	 can	 salvage	 veritism	 at	 the	 expense	 of	literalism.			An	upshot	of	this	discussion	is	to	emphasise	that	the	position	we	have	arrived	at	is	 itself	motivated	by	 something	 very	 close	 to	Elgin’s	 own	account	 of	 scientific	representation.	In	order	for	her	account	of	scientific	representation	to	motivate	her	 anti-veritism,	 it	 better	 be	 the	 case	 that	 the	 sorts	 of	 models	 she	 uses	 to	motivate	 such	 a	 position,	 the	 Hardy-Weinberg	 model	 and	 so	 on,	 come	 out	 as	falsehoods	 (albeit	 felicitous	 ones).	 And	 this	 requires	 that	 they	 be	 interpreted	literally.	To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	Elgin	doesn’t	motivate	why	this	should	be	the	 case	 (as	 we	 have	 seen,	 it	 doesn’t	 follow	 from	 her	 account	 of	 scientific	representation).	 Her	 account	 of	 representation	 thus	 leaves	 two	 ways	 of	accommodating	 the	 use	 of	 idealisations	 in	 science:	 either	 reject	 literalism	 but	retain	veritism,	or	accept	literalism	and	reject	veritism.	Elgin	herself	gives	us	no	reason	 to	 prefer	 the	 latter	 approach.	 This	 leaves	 a	 lacuna	 in	 her	 account	 that	deserves	 to	 be	 addressed,	 and	 as	we	 argue	 in	 the	next	 section,	 there	 are	 good	reasons	to	prefer	the	former	option.				The	 roots	 of	 non-literal	 thinking	 go	 back	 at	 least	 to	 Aristotle’s	 discussion	 of	analogy,	 and	 non-literalism	 has	 become	 a	 prevalent	 doctrine	 in	 philosophy	 of	science	when	the	protagonists	of	the	Vienna	circle	insisted	that	theoretical	terms	had	 to	 be	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 observables.	 In	 the	 more	 recent	 literature	 on	models	 Hesse	 (1963)	 construes	 models	 as	 analogies	 and	 Black	 (1962)	 talks	about	 models	 as	metaphors	 (for	 a	 discussion	 of	 both	 views	 see	 Bailer-Jones’s	(2002)).	 Giere	 (2004),	 Teller	 (2001)	 and	 Weisberg	 (2013)	 characterise	 the	model-world	 relation	 in	 terms	 of	 similarity,	 and	 it	 has	 become	 increasingly	popular	 to	 think	 of	 scientific	models	 as	 analogous	 to	works	 of	 fiction;	 see	 e.g.	
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Bokulich’s	(2009,	2012,	2016),	Frigg’s	(2010),	Toon’s	(2010),	and	Levy’s	(2015),	as	well	as	the	essays	collected	in	Suárez’s	(2009)	and	Woods’	(2010).15		While	 these	 approaches	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 go	 some	way	 to	 accommodating	model-target	mismatches,	it	not	clear	how	far	they	actually	go.	Hesse	explicates	analogy	 in	 terms	 of	 shared	 features	 (1963,	 8).	 Black’s	 theory	 of	metaphor	 still	insists	 that	 a	 successful	 model	 must	 be	 “isomorphic	 with	 its	 domain	 of	application”	 (1962,	 p.	 238).	 Weisberg	 is	 explicit	 that	 similarity	 amounts	 to	sharing	properties	(Weisberg	2013,	Chapter	8),	while	Giere	and	Teller	offer	no	explicit	 analysis	 of	 similarity.	 The	 various	 discussions	 scientific	 models	 in	fictional	 terms	 intertwine	 the	 functional	 and	ontological	 status	of	models,	with	no	 clear	 sense	 of	 non-literalism	 emerging	 from	 those	 who	 focus	 on	 model	functions.	 Bokulich’s	 (2016)	 discussion	 of	 how	 non-verdical	 fictional	 models	provide	understanding	suggests	that	at	least	one	reason	to	think	that	models	are	fictions	is	to	interpret	them	literally;	and	Levy’s	(2015)	analysis	of	how	fictional	models	relate	to	the	world	is	based	on	the	notion	of	partial	truth,	the	idea	that	a	statement	is	partially	true	“if	it	is	true	when	evaluated	only	relative	to	a	subset	of	the	circumstances	that	make	up	its	subject	matter”	(ibid.,	p.	792).	So	upon	closer	inspection	 these	 accounts	 offer	 less	 to	 the	 non-literalist	 than	 she	 would	 have	hoped	for.			Proponents	 of	 these	 accounts	 can	 insist	 that	 the	 accounts	 have	 at	 least	 the	
potential	to	be	developed	in	a	non-literal	way.	The	similarity	account	can	do	this,	for	 instance,	 by	 explicating	 similarity	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 features	 themselves,	rather	than	requiring	that	models	and	their	targets	share	the	exact	same	features	(Khosrowi	forthcoming).	We	agree,	but	the	fact	remains	that	in	the	current	form	none	 of	 them	 provides	 anything	 like	 a	 full-fledged	 account	 of	 how	 non-literal	interpretations	of	models	can	accommodate	 the	sort	of	 idealisations	Elgin	uses	to	 motivate	 her	 non-veritism.	 So	 at	 least	 in	 its	 current	 instantiations,	 non-literalism	remains	little	more	than	promissory	note.	What	is	needed	is	an	explicit	formulation	 of	 a	 non-literal	 account	 of	 representation	 that	 can	 account	 for	 the	kinds	of	examples	that	we	encounter	in	contemporary	model	based	science.	We	do	not	maintain	that	DEKI	has	invented	non-literalism;	but	we	do	maintain	that	it	 is	 the	 only	 bona-fide	 attempt	 in	 the	 current	 discussion	 about	 scientific	representation	to	develop	an	account	that	is	upfront	and	explicit	about	its	non-literal	 commitments	 and	 assigns	 these	 a	 systematic	 place	 in	 its	 theoretical	architecture.16,	17			
																																																								15	We	 are	 grateful	 to	 an	 anonymous	 referee	 for	 encouraging	 us	 to	 think	 about	 discussions	 of	models	and	fiction	in	this	way.		16	Another	 account	 of	 scientific	 representation,	 primarily	 associated	with	 Suárez	 (2004,	 2015)	could	also	be	brought	to	bear	on	this	 issue.	This	“inferential	account”	focuses	on	the	inferences	about	target	systems	by	scientific	models,	and	these	inferences	don’t	have	to	be	underpinned	by	a	 literal	 understanding	 of	 the	 models.	 According	 to	 this	 account	 the	 idealised	 models	 we’re	concerned	with	here	could	be	used	in	way	that	instructs	informed	agents	to	only	draw	inferences	with	 true	 conclusions	 regarding	 the	 target	 from	 them	 (retaining	 veritism),	 but	 do	 so	 by	connecting	them	to	the	explicit	model-target	mismatches	(giving	up	on	literalism).	To	the	best	of	our	knowledge	there	has	been	no	explicit	investigation	yet	about	how	this	could	be	done	in	the	inferential	framework,	but	it	does	seem	like	a	fruitful	avenue	of	research.	
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	Finally	then,	before	moving	on,	it	 is	worth	briefly	recapping	how	what	we	have	said	here	 relates	 to	 the	discussion	of	 realism	vs.	 anti-realism	 in	 Section	2.	The	crucial	thing	to	note	is	that	our	account	of	non-literal	interpretations	cuts	across	any	 of	 the	 distinctions	 drawn	 in	 that	 debate.	 The	 account	 enjoys	 considerable	latitude	both	in	terms	of	the	scope	and	the	nature	of	the	keys,	and	can	thereby	accommodate	 realist	 and	anti-realist	positions	alike.	As	 regards	 scope,	 an	anti-realist	of	the	constructive	empiricist	stripe	who	accepts	the	semantic	stance	but	denies	the	epistemic	one,	could	adopt	DEKI	with	a	literalist	key	and	only	believe	in	claims	about	observable	features	of	the	target	system.	An	anti-realist	who	also	denies	 the	 semantic	 stance	 could	 adopt	 DEKI	 and	 only	 key-up	 observables	features	to	be	imputed	to	targets.	A	selective	realist	could	only	believe,	or	more	radically	only	key-up,	the	particular	kind	of	features	they	are	selective	about.	The	realist	 may	 have	 no	 restrictions	 whatsoever	 about	 the	 type	 of	 features	 they	consider	in	their	Fs	and	Gs.	As	regards	the	nature	of	keys,	the	use	of	non-identity	keys	 in	 no	 way	 implies	 an	 anti-realist	 position.	 Observable	 as	 well	 as	unobservable	parts	of	the	model	can	be	keyed-up	with	a	non-identity	key	and	yet	one	 can	 take	 the	 resulting	 claims	 at	 face	 value.	 So	 adopting	 DEKI	 does	 not	prejudice	what	position	one	has	to	take	in	the	realism	vs.	anti-realism	debate.		We	 thus	 hope	 to	 have	 provided	 an	 account	 of	 scientific	 representation	 that	 is	neutral	 across	 realist/anti-realism	 spectrum,	 and	moreover	 can	 be	 utilised	 by	those	who	are	sensitive	to	the	fact	that	our	best	scientific	models	offer	idealised	representations	of	many	aspects	or	features	of	the	external	world.				
5.	Veritism	vs.	Literalism		So	far	we	have	discussed	two	“packages”,	two	ways	of	dealing	with	the	paradox	outlined	 in	 Section	 3.	 Elgin’s	 package	 is	 to	 renounce	 veritism	 and	 retain	literalism;	 ours	 is	 to	 renounce	 literalism	 and	 retain	 veritism.18	This	 raises	 the	obvious	 question	 whether	 there	 are	 reasons	 to	 prefer	 either	 of	 the	 packages.	Unfortunately	 there	 are	 no	 easy	 answers:	 both	 options	 have	 widespread	implications	 across	 the	 philosophy	 of	 science	 and	 epistemology.	 They’re	wholesale	 views	 about	 scientific	 practice	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 knowledge	 and	understanding,	and	choosing	between	them	seems	to	us	 to	be	 the	sort	of	 thing	which	depends	on	how	one	values	a	package	as	a	whole,	rather	than	the	sort	of	thing	 which	 can	 be	 broken	 down	 into	 neat	 little	 reasons	 to	 prefer	 one	 to	 the	other.			Having	said	that,	we	do	want	to	provide	some	motivations	for	why	the	package	we	have	offered	should	be	considered	attractive.	First,	as	demonstrated	by	our	simple	examples	of	epistemic	representations	above,	namely	the	map	and	wing	mirror	in	Section	4,	and	indeed	Elgin’s	own	example	of	a	caricature,	the	value	of																																																																																																																																																															17 	Additionally,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Section	 5,	 Strevens	 (2008)	 provides	 a	 discussion	 of	 how	idealisations	work,	which,	whilst	 not	 couched	 in	 these	 terms,	 could	be	understood	 in	 terms	of	providing	a	non-literal	account	of	how	they	represent.		18	We	 also	 note	 the	 possibility	 of	 rejecting	 both	 veritivism	 and	 literalism.	 To	 the	 best	 of	 our	knowledge	no	one	in	the	debate	does	this.		
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many	of	these	representations	is	not	accounted	for	by	a	 literal	 interpretation.19	Such	examples	can	be	multiplied	with	ease.	The	colour	of	a	 line	on	a	 tube	map	doesn’t	 represent	 the	 tube	 line	 itself	 as	 being	 coloured	 (it,	 non-literally,	represents	which	particular	line	it	is)	anymore	than	the	litmus	paper	turning	red	represents	 the	 solution	 it	 is	 dipped	 in	 as	 red	 (it,	 non-literally,	 represents	 it	 as	acidic).	 Moreover	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 key	 into	 an	 account	 of	 these	representations	 illuminates	 the	 role	 that	 things	 like	 disciplinary	 practices	 and	interpretational	schemes	(cartographic	traditions,	artistic	styles,	and	so	on),	play	in	our	use	of	such	objects	 to	represent	 the	world.	By	 focusing	our	attention	on	the	keys,	 and	 the	practices	 in	which	 they	are	embedded	 (in	addition	 to,	 rather	than	in	place	of,	the	objects	doing	the	representing	themselves),	we	gain	a	better	understanding	of	how	these	epistemic	representations	work.			Secondly,	the	same	observation	applies	in	the	context	of	scientific	modelling:	we	think	that	our	non-literalism	plus	veritism	package	better	accounts	for	scientific	practice.	As	argued	above,	keys	seem	to	be	operating	implicitly	in	many	cases	of	scientific	modelling.	Engineers	who	use	scale	models	to	study	the	resistance	of	a	ship	when	dragged	through	water	will	not	assume	that	the	model	represents	the	real	 ship	 literally,	 i.e.	 as	 having	 the	 same	 resistance,	 not	 even	 approximately.	They	will	 use	 complicated	 scaling	 relations	 to	derive	 the	 resistance	of	 the	 real	ship	from	the	resistance	of	the	scale	model,	and	these	relations	constitute	the	key	of	the	model.	Similarly,	no	one	infers	from	the	use	of	the	two-dimensional	Ising	model	 in	 statistical	 mechanics	 that	 samples	 of	 K2NF4	 or	 RB2MnF4	 are	 two-dimensional,	or	consist	of	an	infinite	number	of	atoms.	Rather	they	will	infer	that	both	substances	have	strong	horizontal	and	weak	vertical	interactions,	and	that	boundary	effects	will	be	small	 compared	 to	 the	contributions	of	 the	 “mid	grid”	atoms	(Baxter	1982).20			Third,	 our	 package	 has	 the	 benefit	 of	 allowing	 us	 to	 retain	 much	 of	 the	philosophy	of	science	(and	epistemology)	based	on	veritism.	One	of	the	reasons	why	 Elgin’s	 project	 is	 so	 impressive	 is	 its	 broad	 scope	 and	 wide-reaching	implications.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 standard	 way	 of	 understanding	 the	scientific	realism	vs.	anti-realism	debate	is	framed	in	terms	of	truth,	knowledge,	and	belief.	Adopting	Elgin’s	package	would	 require	 reframing	 the	debate	 itself.	And	 this	 isn’t	 restricted	 to	 that	 particular	 debate.	 In	 the	 philosophy	 of	 science	veritist	assumptions	play	central	roles	in	our	understanding	of	various	positions	in,	 for	 example,	 debates	 concerning	 the	 nature	 of	 confirmation,	 induction,	underdetermination,	and	the	role	of	theoretical	virtues	in	theory	choice.	And	the	point	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 philosophy	 of	 science.	 As	 Elgin	 herself	 points	 out,	“philosophy	valorises	truth”	(p.	1),	and	in	epistemology	“the	conviction	that	truth	is	vital	is	virtually	axiomatic”	and	“veritistic	commitments	run	deep.	Abandoning	them	 requires	 radical	 revisions”	 (p.	 9).	 Because	 of	 how	 central	 veritism	 is	 to																																																									19	It’s	 essential	 that	 the	wing	mirror	 gives	 information	 about	 the	distance	 of	 the	 vehicle	 in	 the	back,	 and	 a	 map	 must	 tell	 us	 how	 far	 apart	 places	 are.	 Under	 a	 literal	 interpretation,	 Elgin’s	caricature	 comes	 out	 as	 a	 felicitous	 falsehood:	 it	 generates	 understanding	 but	 not	 factive	information	 about	 its	 subject.	 It	 seems	 more	 natural	 to	 say	 that	 the	 caricature	 is	 simply	 an	accurate	representation	of	the	subject’s	character.	20	Nguyen	(forthcoming)	also	discusses	how	giving	up	on	literalism	can	help	account	for	the	prevalence	of	the	use	of	so-called	‘toy	models’	across	the	sciences.		
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much	of	philosophy	(of	science	and	beyond),	to	see	Elgin’s	project	through	would	require	 radical	 reformulation	of	philosophical	positions	across	 the	board.	 Such	radical	revisions	seem	justified	only	if	there	are	compelling	positive	reasons	that	such	a	reformulation	is	unavoidable.	If	there	were	a	necessity	for	a	revolution	we	would	 welcome	 it.	 But	 rebels	 need	 causes.	 And,	 as	 we	 argue	 above,	 Elgin’s	discussion	 of	 representation	 and	 idealisation	 in	 science	 leaves	 open	 an	alternative	option:	reject	literalism	instead.	This	option	doesn’t	require	the	same	sort	of	radical	philosophical	reformulation,	and	thus	at	 least	prima	facie,	seems	to	be	the	more	economical	way	of	proceeding.21		Fourthly,	 and	 finally,	 in	 arguing	 that	 Elgin’s	 project	 highlights	 a	 paradox	 that	should	worry	anyone	who	accepts	that	idealisations	play	a	significant	epistemic	role	across	contemporary	(and	historical)	science,	we	have	highlighted	that	the	debates	 concerning	 understanding/explanation	 and	 scientific	 representation	have	 to	 be	 addressed	 in	 tandem.	 And,	 as	 should	 be	 expected	 given	 this	connection,	 there	are	echoes	of	our	non-literalist	suggestion	already	present	 in	the	 former,	 in	 particular	 in	 Strevens’	 (2008,	 Chapter	 8;	 2017)	 treatment	 of	idealisation.	Obviously	this	is	not	the	place	to	embark	on	a	detailed	discussion	of	his	“kairetic”	account	of	explanation,	but	it	is	worth	drawing	attention	to	the	fact	that	 his	 approach,	 understood	 as	 a	 non-literal	 way	 of	 accounting	 for	 the	epistemic	 value	 of	 idealised	 scientific	 models,	 provides	 evidence	 that	 non-literalism	is	an	attractive	position.		Strevens	 argues	 that	 idealisations,	 such	 as	 the	 assumption	 that	 there	 are	 no	interactions	 between	 particles	 in	 a	 gas	 which	 is	 used	 in	 the	 derivation	 of	 the	relationship	between	pressure	and	volume	as	 stated	 in	Boyle’s	Law,	 should	be	interpreted	non-literally.	More	precisely,	he	suggests	that	when	a	model	contains	a	 parameter	 that	 is	 set	 to	 zero,	 it	 needn’t	 be	 interpreted	 as	 representing	 the	feature	 in	 the	 target	 system	 corresponding	 to	 that	 parameter	 to	 be	 zero,	 but	rather	 it	 can	be	 interpreted	 as	 representing	 that	 feature	 as	 being	 irrelevant	 to	the	behaviour	represented	by	the	model	(within	a	certain	range	of	scenarios).	So	when	 we	 interpret	 the	 “there	 are	 no	 interactions”	 feature	 of	 the	 model	 as	representing	 the	 feature	 of	 the	 target	 that	 “the	 interactions	 aren’t	 difference	makers	with	respect	to	the	relationship	between	volume	and	pressure”	we	arrive	at	an	accurate	representation	(at	least	in	the	appropriate	regimes,	i.e.	where	the	volume	of	the	container	is	large	enough).	Thus,	we	have	saved	veritivism	at	the	expense	of	literalism.			Whilst	 this	 indicates	 the	sorts	of	possibilities	allowed	by	non-literalism,	 it	does	bear	 noting	 that	 there	 is	 an	 important	 difference	 between	 the	 DEKI	 approach	and	 Strevens’	 treatment.	 The	 latter	 requires	 that	 the	 idealised	 aspect	 of	 the	model	–	the	parameter	that	is	set	to	some	extremal,	obviously	false	if	interpreted	literally,	value	–	represents	the	corresponding	feature	of	the	target	system	as	not	being	 a	 difference-maker.	 Understood	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 DEKI,	 this	 is	 a	
particular	 kind	 of	 non-literal	 key.	 There	 is,	 however,	 a	 question	 whether	 this	approach	 captures	 all	 idealised	 representations.	 Streven’s	 account	 can	 only	 be																																																									21	Having	said	that	we	are	inclined	to	see	the	revolutionary	aspect	of	Elgin’s	project	as	a	positive	for	its	own	sake,	at	least	in	the	sense	that	it	widens	the	logical	space	of	philosophy.		
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applied	in	cases	where	the	idealisation	takes	the	form	of	setting	a	parameter	to	an	extremal	value.	There	are,	however,	cases	of	idealisation	in	which	this	is	not	the	case.	The	distortions	present	in	the	mirrors	with	warnings,	maps,	and	e.g.	the	use	of	model	 ships	discussed	above,	 are	not	of	 this	 form,	 and	 it	 is	not	obvious	how	 Strevens’	 account	 of	 idealisation	 would	 deal	 with	 them.	 The	 DEKI	framework	allows	for	different	keys	in	these	cases,	and,	possibly,	keys	according	to	which	the	idealisations	can	play	a	more	positive	representational	role	rather	than	 just	 flagging	 features	 as	 not	 being	 difference-makers.	22	Regardless	 of	 the	details	of	how	one	goes	about	dealing	with	these	sorts	of	idealisations,	it	should	be	 clear	 how	 the	 DEKI	 account	 of	 scientific	 representation	 provides	 a	 more	general	and	systemic	framework	in	which	to	investigate	how	non-literal	keys	can	be	utilised	to	save	veritism.			Now,	we	are	not	arguing	that	these	observations	are	knockdown	arguments	for	why	one	should	reject	 literalism	rather	than	veritism	when	faced	with	the	core	contradiction	of	Section	3.	But	taken	together	we	hope	that	they	are	persuasive,	and,	 perhaps	 more	 importantly,	 that	 they	 indicate	 what’s	 at	 stake	 in	 such	 a	decision.	Regardless	of	which	package	prevails,	Elgin’s	work	illuminates	a	central	question	 concerning	 how	 scientific	 models	 contribute	 to	 our	 epistemological	goals.			
6.	Conclusion		We	 have	 argued	 that	 Elgin’s	 project	 highlights	 a	 paradox	 that	 should	 worry	anyone	who	accepts	that	 idealisations,	which	are	 false	and	sometimes	radically	so	 if	 interpreted	 literally,	 play	 a	 significant	 epistemic	 role	 across	 science.	 This	paradox	brings	together	the	questions	of	how	to	understand	the	role	of	truth	in	explanation	and	understanding,	and	of	how	to	interpret	such	idealisations	in	the	first	place.	This	shows	that	 these	two	debates	have	to	be	addressed	 in	 tandem.	We	 demonstrated	 how	 Elgin,	 herself	 a	 significant	 contributor	 to	 both	 debates,	provides	 an	 account	 of	 scientific	 representation	 that	 is	 compatible	 with	literalism,	 thereby	 providing	 the	 means	 with	 which	 to	 undercut	 her	 own	argument	 against	 veritism.	 In	 addition,	 we	 provided	 some	 arguments	 for	why	literalism	might	be	preferred	to	a	rejection	of	veritism.	Most	 importantly,	what	we	 hope	 to	 have	 done	 is	 demonstrate	 where	 the	 various	 fault	 lines	 and	connections	lie	in	the	debates	in	question,	and	draw	attention	to	how	significant	they	are	for	the	philosophy	of	science.			
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